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Abstract 
 
Dennis Collentine, 2003. Policies and tools for catchment management of water resources: 
Field management, tradable permits and stakeholder participation.  
Doctoral Thesis. 
ISSN 1401-6249, ISBN 91-576-6476-5 
 
This dissertation is a set of related articles. The five articles deal with alternative tools and 
policies for addressing water quality management. The focus of the dissertation is on 
management decisions of three groups at the catchment level: farmers, other stakeholders 
and catchment authorities. 
   The first two articles address how field management decisions are made by farmers. The 
first of these two articles presents a linear cost method for calculating the economic impact 
of adopting particular ‘best management practices’ (BMPs) on individual fields. The second 
article describes how decision heuristics may be used by farmers for making management 
choices within a framework of bounded rationality. This article presents a decision support 
system (DSS) that has been developed for evaluation of best management practices (BMPs). 
The model presented here, called LENNART, is a net-based interactive database that 
combines a natural science model, SOILNDB, with the linear cost method developed in the 
first article for the evaluation of BMPs. The model works with heuristics to support BMP 
implementation decisions by farmers. 
The second two articles take up the application of tradable discharge permit (TDP) policy 
to reduce nutrient losses from farmland from non-point sources (NPS) of pollution. The first 
of these two articles is reactive. This article surveys the status of discharge trading programs 
and concludes that the lack of success of these programs is due to design problems, 
specifically the lack of well-defined property rights to the discharges. The second article is 
proactive and describes how a composite market system for TDP may be designed to fulfil 
its primary purpose, the cost effective abatement of nutrient discharges. 
      The fifth article describes a method for structuring stakeholder participation in the 
management of water resources at the catchment level. The model described in this article, 
CATCH, builds on the use of the principles of discourse and deliberation to define sets of 
socio-economic parameters for the evaluation of management plans. 
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Preface 
 
This thesis is about water. A subject which I knew little about other then through 
my experience as an enthusiastic user, prior to my participation in the Swedish 
Water Management Research Program (VASTRA). I have been given the 
opportunity over the last four and a half years to learn not only a lot about water 
but also to work within an area where the academic community participates 
actively with the community outside the ivory towers. This particular aspect has 
been important to the development of my work.  
 
On a personal level, economic theory for me has always been a way to interpret 
the world around me. Theory is interesting in that it allows me to see events from 
an abstract perspective. Being a relatively inquisitive person, I like to ask a lot of 
questions, applying economic theory gives me an opportunity to indulge my 
curiosity about the world and hopefully develop some insight about what I see. 
The thesis that follows is an expression of that curiosity and hopefully 
communicates some of that insight  
 
This thesis owes a great deal to great number of people. Since it is customary in 
books to have a preface that is shorter than the work that follows, this necessarily 
limits the acknowledgement of people and events that have contributed to this 
thesis. On a social plane there are numerous family members and friends that have 
provided me with inspiration and support. Though your names don’t appear below 
this is not reflective of your importance to me, thanks. This is also true for many of 
the people I have had the pleasure of sharing a common workplace with over the 
years. What I would like to do in the following paragraphs is single out a few of 
the people and their contributions that have had a direct impact on the 
development of this thesis.  
 
I want to start by acknowledging two people from the University of Gävle where 
I have been employed for the past eight years. First the person who made it 
possible for me to be offered a tenured position in the Department of Economics at 
Gävle and then who later saw to it that I left the department to work on my 
doctoral degree, Apostolos Bantekas. While Apostolos is greatly responsible for 
getting me started on this dissertation the contribution of another colleague, Mats 
Landström, has allowed me to finish it. Mats took over a course that I was 
scheduled to teach at the same time that I needed to make the last minute 
adjustments and format the thesis before turning it over to the printer. The fact that 
you are reading these lines is in part attributable to Mats’ help. 
 
However, the greatest impact on the content of the thesis has come from people 
that have been associated with the VASTRA research program. Some of their 
names appear on two of the articles included in the thesis but there are other names 
that do not. Hans Bertil Wittgren, the program director for VASTRA during the 
first phase of the program, provided support for the development of the DSS 
LENNART that is the focus of the first two articles in the thesis. He not only gave 
his encouragement and support for the model conceptually but in his role as 
program director he also made funding available that made possible the 
development of the prototype described in these articles. In addition, Hans Bertil  
and Lars Anders Hansson’s enthusiasm for the model CATCH led to continued 
work with the ideas behind this model and the fifth article in this thesis. The 
current program director of VASTRA, Anna Jöborn, has followed development of 
all three models described in the thesis with interest and promoted support for 
these models both within the program and through contact with potential users. 
Although there are many other people within the present VASTRA program as 
well as those that have been involved with VASTRA in the past that could be 
acknowledged here, there a few people I’d like to single out.   
 
During Phase I of the VASTRA program one of the tasks of the sub-program I 
worked with was the development of an integrated decision support tool for 
nutrient management. In particular, a model which would combine three sub-
models: a bio-physical agronomic model of root-zone movements of nitrogen, a 
distributed hydrological model of groundwater flows and an economic model of 
the farm level and social costs of best management practices (BMP). After initial 
attempts by the entire sub-group of researchers (10-15) to identify these models 
and what they would do, the task devolved to a group of three people.  
 
Martin Larsson from the Department of Soil Sciences (Water Quality 
Management) at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) was one 
of these people.  Martin brought many positive qualities with him which made it 
possible to accomplish the task set out for us; he was a hydrologist by training, 
worked within the department that was developing a model for characterizing 
nitrogen leaching from agricultural practices, had worked with other model 
development, was a farmer and lastly was not only able to work effectively with 
others but could laugh easily as well. The second person was Nils Hannerz, at the 
start of our cooperation a VASTRA doctoral student at the Division of Land and 
Water Resources at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH). While Nils was 
employed at the Royal Institute to work with groundwater modelling his passion 
was systems analysis, an interest that he found an outlet for in the work to design a 
decision support system (DSS) for nutrient management. Nils left his position at 
KTH and after a stint in Gothenburg working as freelancer started working as a 
research assistant at the Swedish Institute of Agricultural and Environmental 
Engineering (JTI) in Uppsala. Nils brought with him not only his analytical 
sensibilities, familiarity with hydrology and computer programming skills but also 
a lot of enthusiasm. An enthusiasm that included working with practical solutions 
and applications as well as for new ideas. I was the third member of the group, the 
economist. 
 
The three of us worked together over a period of two years to develop the 
prototype of the DSS LENNART. The model evolved as a combination of interests 
and expertise but I think primarily as a result of the ability of both Martin and Nils 
to not only listen to each other (and put up with me) but also the congeniality that 
was always present in our discussions.  During this time we not only developed a 
model but also a friendship.  
 
There are a couple of other people that should be mentioned in connection  with 
development of the model LENNART. Hans Bertil Wittgren was already named 
above, however there is another person whose contribution I would like to 
acknowledge here: Holger Johnsson also at the Department of Soil Sciences  
(Water Quality Management) at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
(SLU). Holger, who developed the SOILN/SOILNDB models that are used in 
LENNART to estimate nitrate leaching, sat in on many of the planning meetings 
with Martin, Nils and myself where his support, encouragement and suggestions 
were all positive contributions to our work.  
 
I also want to name here several VASTRA doctoral colleagues with whom I’ve 
worked and who are all co-authors to the fifth article in the thesis. The idea that led 
to the CATCH model described in this article evolved out of a doctoral course 
workshop sponsored by VASTRA. Three of the other participants in the workshop 
continued to work with the idea; Annika Ståhl-Delbanco, Sofia Kallner Bastviken 
and Åsa Forsman. A fourth VASTRA doctoral candidate, Victor Galaz got 
involved in the project later on. While Åsa went on to work in other areas after 
finishing her doctorate, the remaining four of us have continued to work with the 
model and promote its application as a method for involving stakeholders in 
catchment area management. 
 
In addition, among my many colleagues at the Department of Economics at the 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) there a couple people who I 
would like to single out by name. Rob Hart served as the opponent at my final 
seminar where he waded through all the work presented in this thesis. The logic 
and scientific merit of the unpublished pieces of the thesis were all improved due 
to his comments. Over the period that I have worked at the department I have 
presented various parts of the material in this thesis at seminars. While the number 
of participants at these seminars has not been extensive (an understatement), there 
has been one person that has consistently participated, Ficre Zehaie. I would like to 
think that it was the quality of the presentations that brought Ficre back time after 
time but I think it really reflects his intrinsic respect for other people and their 
ideas.  
 
Two other people at the department that I want to acknowledge are Clas 
Eriksson and Christina Brundin. The door to Clas’s office is always open. I’ve 
gone there more than once and gotten help with something. These ‘somethings’ 
can be found here and there in the thesis articles. When I look around my office as 
I write these final lines in my thesis I see the piles and stacks of papers that I need 
to spend some time sorting and cataloguing after I finish. These piles represent a 
lot of the background for the thesis. They are copies of articles and chapters that 
I’ve used to position the research and to develop ideas. Christina, the librarian here 
at the department, has first searched out and then painstakingly made copy after 
copy after all my requests and then delivered these to my mailbox. This has 
allowed me to spend less time searching and copying and more time thinking and 
communicating.  
 
Finally, and that was a long time getting to this word, there is one more very 
important person whose support was always present, my adviser Lars Drake. It’s 
often difficult to identify what particular support is most critical in the 
development of ideas. This is the case with Lars Drake’s involvement in the 
evolution of not only the model LENNART but also with the other ideas presented 
in this thesis. What Lars provided from the start of our involvement was respect 
and as a direct result of that respect, freedom. This was important to me as it  
allowed me to work on ideas that I felt were important and to follow through with 
these ideas. I think in retrospect that I could have been clearer in communicating to 
others the ideas that are represented in this thesis, but I could blame this in part on 
the fact that it has always been easy to communicate them to Lars. I’ve never felt 
that any suggestions that I came with were ever negatively met by Lars but rather 
that I always came away from our discussions with both more enthusiasm as well 
as a few good suggestions for improvements. Since Lars has always been pleased 
to discover instances when I use the English language improperly I’ve included 
this last one for him. 
 
Dennis Collentine, 
Uppsala, October 2003.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“When all you have is a hammer – everything starts looking like nails.” 
Chris Barnes, systems analyst, Australian National University, at the conference: 
Agricultural Effects on Ground and Surface Water, Oct. 1-4, 2000, Wageningen, 
Holland. 
 
The research presented in this thesis is about choices in a real world full of time 
constraints, partial (asymmetric) information, site-specific physical parameters and 
individual values. The environmental problems that are at the heart of water 
quality problems are the effects that human activities have on water quality. The 
main focus of the research is on how choices are made which have an impact on 
water quality. One part of the research is aimed at techniques for evaluating the 
costs of adopting better water quality management practices on the farm. A second 
part of the research is about the design of environmental policy that reduces 
information costs for polluters making investment abatement decisions that will 
reduce the flows of nutrients from land use. The third part of the research deals 
with how stakeholders in a catchment area can participate in water quality 
management choices. 
 
The research was performed as a part of a Swedish national research program for 
water management (VASTRA). The goal of the program defined at the inception 
of the first three-year phase (VASTRA, 1998, p.1) was “to develop catchment-
based water management strategies that are sustainable from ecological, 
economical and social perspectives”. One of the partial goals identified in the 
program plan (VASTRA, 1998, p.11) was to arrive at a state “where individual 
actors, or groups of cooperating actors, have the tools and incentives to plan and 
take measures that are economically and environmentally sound in terms of 
management of nutrient fluxes”. To achieve these goals the research program 
supported and coordinated a multi-disciplinary approach to the development of 
management tools. The models presented in this thesis are part of the outcome of 
the program and that approach.  
 
Natural science models describe environment effects; economic models describe 
the human decision environments that lead to the effects. One of the models 
described in the thesis is a combination of a biophysical process model of the root-
zone area of cultivated fields and an economic behavioral model. The product of 
this combination is a decision support system, a model for field management of 
nutrients. A second model in the thesis suggests how biophysical nutrient transport 
models can be used to establish limited property rights which in turn make it 
possible to create markets for transferable discharge permits based on those rights. 
The primary goal of the third thesis model is to determine a set of socio-economic 
parameters and biophysical indicators for a particular catchment that reflects 
stakeholder preferences based on site-specific characteristics.  
 
As a national research program, the focus of VASTRA has been on the search 
for solutions to water quality problems in Sweden. Descriptions of water quality 
problems, in particular eutrophication, and the alternative abatement measures that   12
                                                
are used to develop and illustrate the models reflect current conditions in Sweden. 
A subsidy program for the cultivation of catch crops supported by the Swedish 
Board of Agriculture was used to analyze farmers’ decision to adopt best 
management practices and serves as the prototype in the decision support system 
developed as a result of that analysis. A eutrophic system of lakes in southern 
Sweden was used to illustrate how a catchment based model for stakeholder 
participation could be used to evaluate alternative abatement measures. Although 
the models were developed primarily to address water quality problems in 
Sweden, the principles are universally applicable. Each of the models may be 
adapted for use in other environments through changes in content while 
maintaining the basic model structure.    
 
The purpose of the thesis is to explore how analysis of individual choices and 
preferences may be used to support decisions in the management of water 
resources. The three models presented in the thesis are the result of that analysis. 
Two of the models are decision support systems (DSS) that work within the 
constraints of present policy. These two models are tools. The first is a field 
management tool for supporting choices by farmers. The second is a tool to 
support the inclusion of stakeholder preferences in water management through 
participation in the decision-making process. The third model is a policy proposal 
for a transferable discharge permit (TDP) program design that specifically 
addresses choices made by agricultural producers as well as other non-point 
sources (NPS) of pollution. A unifying factor is that all three models are designed 
for use in the management of water resources at a catchment level. Why at a 
catchment level? What is it that makes catchments an appropriate level for 
development of management models? This is the question discussed in the first 
section below. In addition, each of the models targets a particular set of decision 
makers at the catchment level. These decision environments are discussed in the 
second section below. The final section describes the three models, summarizes 
the research and discusses the possible extensions and applications of the models. 
 
1.1 Why catchment management? 
From a natural science perspective, the argument that catchment areas are the 
appropriate level for water management is easy to accept. The catchment serves as 
the organizational unit for spatial surface water flows including the interface 
between groundwater and surface water.
1 However, present socio-political 
structures have not been designed with catchment boundaries as an organizing 
principle. Therefore for social scientists the arguments for catchment based 
management are weaker. The argument made by the US EPA Office of Water 
(EPA, 1996) is representative of the reasoning usually found for watershed 
management from a socio-political perspective: “Watershed protection can also 
 
1 Although groundwater is not organized in catchment areas, application of the 
ideas presented here are equally applicable to water management based spatially 
on aquifers. The discussions in this section assume that groundwater is subject to 
catchment management, an assumption that also corresponds to the management 
principles of the EU Water Directive as well.   13
                                                
lead to greater awareness and support from the public. Once individuals become 
aware of and interested in their watershed, they often become more involved in 
decision-making as well as hands-on protection and restoration efforts. Through 
such involvement, watershed approaches build a sense of community, help reduce 
conflicts, increase commitment to the actions necessary to meet environmental 
goals, and ultimately, improve the likelihood of success for environmental 
programs.”   
 
While the results of involvement are clear what appears to be missing are 
reasons beyond altruism for generating this interest. Factors which may help to 
understand the motivation behind the presumed interest are important to 
understand as there seems to be a general consensus that stakeholder involvement 
will be the guiding principle for catchment level management (NRC 1996, WWF 
2001, O’Neil and Spash 2000)). 
 
Availability and water management 
In order to explore why catchment areas are the appropriate level for defining 
boundaries for water management it is important to start with a description of the 
resource being managed. Water is not a homogenous resource. Water is a 
collective term for a variety of resources with similar properties. Water resources 
are of varying quality as well as unevenly spatially distributed. Some types of 
water are appropriate for some uses while other types may be appropriate for other 
uses. These uses are the services provided by that particular resource, in this case 
by a particular type of water quality.
2  Table 1 lists examples of service categories 
provided by water. Not all these services need to be, or can be, provided by one 
type of water quality. For example, if the service provided is recreational boating 
the water quality required to provide this service is relatively low. Although 
ambient properties may be of importance as well and indeed increase the quality of 
recreation, the primary requirement refers to volume rather than quality. Water 
quality requirements for human consumption, on the other hand, are rather 
narrowly defined and regarded as high quality. Table 1 includes a list of quality 
demands for the services described; the range is from the highest quality, 
narrowest definition, to the lowest quality, the broadest definition.  
 
There are some water quality types that can serve a wide variety of uses, while 
others are more use specific. For example, drinking water may be used for a wide 
variety of services that may not require that particular quality (irrigation, waste 
treatment, etc) but which is completely satisfactory if used for these purposes. 
However, if the service being provided is a specific environment that supports a 
specific aquatic biotope then perhaps drinking water quality may not be able to 
provide this service. In addition, while drinking water quality may be satisfactory 
for recreational boating the reverse doesn’t hold. The degree to which the water 
quality demanded for a specific service can support a range of other services is 
described in Table 1 as the inclusivity of that service. If the quality can only 
support a narrow range of services then this is categorized as a less inclusive class. 
 
2 See Bergstrom et al 2001 or NRC 1997 for elaboration of the concept of service 
flows as the basis for valuation.   14
It should be noted here that this designation is not intended to serve as a proper 
classification based on theory but rather as an ad hoc indicator that describes an 
important characteristic. This characteristic is of interest in the discussions about 
the conflict over allocation of water classes for the provision of services in a 
catchment, the central theme of this section. Water management is therefore about 
the allocation of water quality to provide desired services. The next step to analyze 
is what is meant by water quality allocation.  
 
Table 1. Surface water service flows, related quality demand and 
exclusivity/inclusivity of usage. (Adapted from NRC 1997) 
 
Type of service flow  Quality   Inclusivity 
Drinking water  High quality  Inclusive, broad range of 
applicability 
Irrigation Low  quality,  some 
non-biological 
contaminants may be a 
problem 
Inclusive for uses where 
quality is not critical 
Non-irrigation 
agricultural use 
High quality for 
livestock 
Similar to drinking water, 
but less inclusive 
Manufacturing of 
food products 
High quality  As for drinking water 
Manufacturing of 
non-food products 
Low quality  Inclusive for services where 
volume not quality is 
important 
Power production  Low quality for hydro, 
higher quality for 
cooling use 
Similar to non-food 
manufacturing 
Waste treatment  Low quality  Similar to non-food 
manufacturing 
Recreational 
swimming 
Less than drinking 
water quality, ambient 
quality important 
Broad range of uses, less 
inclusive then drinking water 
Recreational boating  Less demanding than 
swimming quality 
Volume most important 
Fishing  Must be able to support 
desired aquatic life 
May be used for all uses 
where volume is the primary 
factor 
Biotope support  Must be appropriate 
for the particular 
biotope 
Inclusive for all volume uses, 
may be used for higher 
quality services as well 
 
Allocation of a resource is the distribution of measurable quantities of a 
particular good. The allocation of water, what is commonly described as water 
management, is the allocation of classes of water quality to support services. The 
allocation of water is making available a quantity of an appropriate quality of 
water for that particular service. As noted above, due to the fact that the classification of availability is based on the services that can be provided 
availability may be multi-purpose, i.e. broadly inclusive. For example, drinking 
water quality made available for household consumption may be used for human 
consumption or for services, which could be provided by a lower grade of water 
quality, such as that needed for sanitation or lawn maintenance purposes. 
However, availability may also be single purpose, narrowly inclusive. An example 
of this is water that provides a service to a particular biotope may not be able to 
provide that service if it is diverted to other services. Availability is a description 
of a particular water allocation based on the services, which that allocation 
provides, an allocation which is limited by the capacity of the system.
3  
 
A change in allocation related to volumes and qualities is a change in the state of 
availability. Availability can therefore be regarded as a state variable, a variable, 
which describes a particular arrangement of availability for a single class of water 
quality or for a combination of water quality classes. Spatially, availability may be 
used to describe the allocation of water quality classes in a catchment area. 
Temporally, availability depends on flows. In addition to flow variation, changes 
in this state variable may also be due to changes in factors which control the level 
of the state variable, either through increases or decreases in capacity for the 
provision of services and/or reallocation of the flows between services. Increases 
in capacity may also be described as investment decisions where the cost of 
investment is the capital investment needed to increase capacity for that service.
4 
 
Figure 1. Valuation of water services 
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Availability of a water quality type provides value to the users of the services 
that this state makes possible. The value is not in the water but in the service, 
which the water provides (Figure 1). A particular state of availability can be 
described by the aggregated value of the services provided by that state. The value 
 
3 Capacity may also serve to describe the state of availability. However, the total 
sum of availability must always be less than or equal to total capacity and 
increases in capacity may not always lead to a reallocation of availability. Thus, 
the correspondence is not exact and although each of these concepts may be of use 
jointly to describe conflict resolution, for expositionary purposes they are 
considered separately. 
4 Adaman and Devine (2001) describe this type of activity, increased capacity, as a 
result of market forces as distinct from market exchange.   16
                                                
is the difference between the benefits generated by the service and the costs of 
providing the service. The costs are the direct costs associated with the production 
of the service as well as the indirect costs (opportunity costs), which this particular 
use generates. The benefits are aggregates derived from individual benefits, the 
value of the service to users of the service. A recent study on the economic value 
of water (Bergstrom et al, 2001) describes the source of value which gives rise to 
the benefits, as follows (p.10): 
" … the economic value of water quality to individual j  is influenced by the 
socioeconomic characteristics of individual j.  These socioeconomic characteristics 
include indicators of tastes and preferences such as age and education, and 
indicators of environmental and public good attitudes such as the priorities an 
individual places on public provision of various goods and services." 
 
However, since many of these services have the nature of public goods or other 
non-market values aggregation may be impractical (costly) or impossible 
(indivisible).
5 An alternative method is to treat the values generated by these 
services as social costs and benefits. Instead of the value being an aggregation of 
individual values driven by the “socioeconomic characteristics of the individual”, 
these characteristics can be aggregated and values derived from the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the aggregated individuals, the social community. Using this 
method, the value of the state variable availability is driven by a set of 
socioeconomic parameters of the community that reflects the costs and benefits of 
water management strategies for the provision of services (allocation of water 
quality) to that community. The common denominator for this community is that 
they derive value from the services provided by the same class of water; this also 
serves to define an interest group associated with that service.  
 
Allocation conflicts in a catchment area 
Conflict over use of a resource presumes that the resource in question is shared, 
that is, in the framework of the discussion presented above that it may be used to 
provide alternative services. The more inclusive the water quality class, the more 
alternative services that may be in conflict over allocation of that class of water. 
Allocation of availability assigns values to the services provided (as in Figure 1). 
Changes in the state variable availability are a reassignment of value and can be 
described by the costs and benefits attached to the reassignment. Following the 
flows described in Figure 1, the reassignment is a change in availability and there 
are costs associated with that change. However, the reassignment must be driven 
by the benefits that accrue to users of the services.  
 
All volumes of all types of water quality are being used at every point in time in 
each state to support a flow of services. The present state of availability represents 
a dynamic tension between conflicting interests over the allocation of water 
classes, the services provided and the net value (costs and benefits) derived from 
 
5 Valuation techniques such as contingent valuation are commonly used to 
estimate these aggregate values, see Söderholm (2001) for a critical comparison of 
using this valuation technique and valuation derived from using deliberative 
methods.   17
                                                
those services. There are no surpluses to be allocated, therefore any change gives 
rise to changes in the costs and benefits derived from the services. Changes in 
availability are allocations of gains and losses to the users of the services that are 
affected by the change, the stakeholders. Conflicts in stakeholder interests in a 
catchment arise from the distribution of the gains and losses due to changes in the 
provision of (availability of) services. 
 
For example, a higher volume of drinking water may be made available through 
infiltration, active water purification, prevention of a flow of contaminants, etc. 
Each of these measures, which are also control variables, changes the state of 
availability and has associated direct or indirect costs as well as benefits. If the 
demands for a service increase ceteris paribus, then the potential value for that 
service increases as a result of the increase in benefits and the change in net value 
depends on the costs of reallocating availability. For example, if the demand for 
drinking water in a catchment area increases due to an increase in population, the 
change in net value depends on the direct and indirect costs of increasing 
availability for that service. If the volume of drinking water increases through 
drilling new wells, the direct cost of the change in state would include the costs for 
drilling and distribution. Indirect cost may include among others, the decrease in 
the option value of the groundwater when it is no longer available as a reserve or 
the possible subsidence of structures due to the removal of groundwater locally. As 
another example, if the volume of water quality available for support for aquatic 
biotopes were to increase through the reduction of nutrients entering watercourses 
from farming practices, the direct costs would include any losses in farm income, 
while the benefits would accrue to stakeholders that derive value from the 
existence of the biotope. The benefits are always the aggregate gains to the 
stakeholders who derive value from the increase in the availability of water for that 
service. The changes in value are a redistribution of value among users of the 
associated services, which may be positive for some (benefits) and negative for 
some (costs). The net change is the social value of moving from one state to 
another, the value of the change in services.  
 
Services provided by the availability of water quality are local in relation to the 
spatial location of the water type providing the service. Water provides a service 
where it is spatially located. Water in a lake provides a recreational boating service 
on that lake. The same water could provide a recreational boating service at 
another location only if it is transported to that location. Ignoring for the moment 
flows between locations (a waterway system), transport of sufficient volumes for 
an activity such as recreational boating is expensive due to the volumes that would 
need to be transported.
 6 This is true in general; the human-induced movement of 
water flows in the volumes needed to provide services is costly. To justify this 
transport reallocation the benefits need to cover the cost of transportation as well 
as the costs due to the change in service flows. This is especially relevant when 
considering reallocation from one catchment area to another. Within a catchment 
area transport costs are less significant. Increases in availability upstream may be 
 
6 A dam could, for example, be built to provide boating services at another 
location within the catchment.   18
achieved by building dams; downstream availability may increase if drainage 
systems are constructed in upstream areas. 
 
The aggregate value of a class of water as described above depends on 
availability. If availability were not constraining then that class of water would be 
expected to have a low value. In an area of abundant rainfall there is a high degree 
of availability for services such as watering lawns and the value from increases in 
availability, by increasing capacity for example, would be relatively low. The 
costs, in turn, for providing this service would have to be extremely low if there 
were an expectation for positive changes in net value for increasing capacity. Costs 
are a limiting factor for reallocation of water services. Within a catchment area 
geographical proximity lowers the costs of transportation associated with 
reallocation. In addition, movement within a catchment may also be possible 
through diversion at a lower cost than transport. Therefore within a catchment 
there is a potential for low cost provision of services and a potential for high net 
value for these services locally.  Conversely, transport of services to areas outside 
of the catchment is associated with high costs and even though benefits may be 
large the net value is likely to be relatively low. Conflicts over allocation will be 
most pronounced where changes in net values from reallocation are the highest. 
 
There are two reasons for management of water resources at the catchment level. 
Firstly, catchment areas are relevant for reallocation decisions because the greatest 
effects of reallocation, the highest changes in the social value of moving between 
states, will be local. The services provided by water have the highest value locally 
and thus any changes to these services will have the greatest impact locally. The 
concept of including stakeholders (the recipients of the service flows provided by 
availability) in reallocation decisions is in recognition of the fact that the current 
and presumptive stakeholders that incur the greatest changes in value will probably 
be found in the catchment area. Secondly, negative changes in water quality have 
their source in the catchment as well. There must be a surface of contact between 
the polluting generating activity and water in the catchment. Although it is the 
activity that creates the pollution, the contact surface allows the pollutant to 
degrade the water quality. Mitigation may be possible through either changes in 
the activity or changes in the contact surface; both of these take place within the 
catchment itself. 
 
1.2 Catchment decision arenas  
Development of decision support systems (DSS) and policies for water quality 
management starts with identification of the decision environment. The decisions 
themselves are the key to identifying the actors (the stakeholders) in that particular 
decision. However, there is another aspect of the decision environment that is 
characterized by the institutions that not only constrain the decision but also those 
which are constrained by the decision. 
 
Each of the circles in Figure 2 represents a decision arena, the institutional 
environment within which a decision is made. The concentric nature of the 
decision arenas is due to the limitations imposed by a regulative hierarchy. 
Decisions made at the national level (national policy) must be consistent with the decisions made at the EU level (policy). Management decisions made at the 
catchment level must be consistent with national policy and decisions at the farm 
level (field level for land use decisions) consistent with regulations and standards 
determined at the catchment level which in turn are consistent with national policy, 
which is consistent with EU policy.
7  
 
How does this relate to development of policy and DSS? Decisions are choices 
made over a set of alternatives. Policy in the preceding (higher) circle determines 
the domain of alternatives in the lower circle. The starting point when analyzing a 
decision that affects water quality is to determine which of these arenas is of 
primary interest. Farm level decisions cannot be analyzed without assumptions 
about the limitations imposed by the higher levels. It is easiest to illustrate this 
principle with an example, the size of a tax on the nitrogen content in fertilizer. 
 
Figure 2. Decision arenas for water quality management 
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A national tax on nitrogen content changes the shape of the second circle in 
Figure 2, the ‘national’ arena. This circle defines behavior constraints imposed on 
all actors  (activities) within the institution defined as a nation. Under a new tax 
policy all activities that take place within the jurisdiction of this institution must be 
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7 Farms are used here as a proxy for water users at the catchment level. This group 
includes all users at this level: households, industrial users, etc.   20
                                                
consistent with the new tax. The decision alternatives facing actors are altered by 
the constraint imposed and the new set of alternatives must conform to the new 
information. Thus even though the tax in the end is expected to alter the set of 
decision alternatives faced by farmers, the lowest scale of decision arenas, it also 
changes the sets of decision alternatives for other institutions below the national 
arena. A catchment authority working with water quality management must take 
into account the effect of the tax on its decision arena. For example, the 
environmental benefits of investment in wetland restoration may be impacted by a 
nitrogen tax.
8 At a higher hierarchical level the proposed tax must be studied to see 
if it is consistent with the immediately higher decision arena, in this case EU 
policy.  
 
The three models for water quality management developed in this thesis may all 
be described in terms of decision arenas. The first model, the DSS LENNART, 
was developed to be used by farmers and farm advisers for support in making field 
management decisions. This arena corresponds to the inner circle in Figure 2, the 
field level. Although the decision maker is the same as at the farm level, the 
farmer, the type of decision being made is more limited and a subset of farm level 
decisions. The types of decision alternatives that the model LENNART is designed 
to work with all conform to higher institutional decision arenas. What this means 
is that the model works within the constraints of these existing institutions and that 
information from these higher arenas enter the model exogenously. The model is 
not designed to analyze which field management practices are most cost effective 
for catchment management of water quality but rather which set of management 
practices is most cost effective for management of a particular field.
9  
 
The second model, the composite market model, is a policy for water quality 
management in the catchment arena (the third inner circle in Figure 2). This means 
that it is consistent with higher arenas, i.e. that implementation doesn’t require any 
changes in institutions at higher levels and that information from higher levels can 
be exogenously included in the model. The policy does change the set of decision 
alternatives both at the catchment level and at lower levels. On the farm the policy 
may define a new set of decision alternatives that a farmer faces in making a field 
management decision. For example, one of the markets in the composite model 
constrains particular management choices; the new set of alternatives for the 
choice constrained farmer now includes the purchase of transferable discharge 
permits (TDP). 
 
The third model, CATCH, is a decision support system for the development of 
water quality management policy at the catchment level. The model therefore is 
 
8 If a tax decreases the quantity of nitrogen leached from arable land, the reduced 
flow of nitrogen to the wetland will decrease the effectiveness of nitrogen removal 
provided by the wetland and as a result increase the unit cost of nitrogen removal. 
Under these circumstances, the value of benefits from investment in wetland 
construction as nutrient sinks will be impacted by a tax. 
9 However, user information stored in the model database may be used for 
development of catchment management policies and/or tools. 
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consistent with institutions at higher levels but may define new sets of decision 
alternatives within the catchment and at lower levels (farms). If the development 
of policy alternatives at the catchment level identified through use of the model is 
constrained by higher arenas, then this may be interpreted as an indication that 
lobbying efforts and/or policy reform are necessary for effective catchment 
management.  
 
The use of the decision arena concept for analysis is primarily for purposes of 
identifying whether the proposed program creates new institutional forms, works 
within existing institutional forms or requires new institutional forms before it can 
be made operable. As described above all three models developed in the thesis 
work in the catchment or farm arenas and work within the existing institutional 
structure of higher arenas. Therefore implementation of the models doesn’t require 
any institutional change above the catchment level.  
 
 
2. Tools and policies for water quality 
management 
 
The following sections describe how the three models developed in the thesis 
contribute to the management of water resources in the catchment. The models are 
intended to serve as management support alternatives to be used where appropriate 
and in combination with other types of management support models. They are not 
designed to be used as an integrated universal tool applicable in all cases. The 
hope is that the descriptions of the problems that these models were developed to 
work with and how they work will allow potential users access to them as 
management support. Using ‘the right tool for the right job’ means that there must 
be more than a hammer in the toolbox before the user starts seeing more than just 
‘nails’. 
 
Two of the models are designed to work with management support for best 
management practices (BMPs) as a part of agri-environmental policy. The first 
section below describes how these types of policies are intended to mitigate a 
particular environmental problem associated with water quality, that of 
eutrophication. This section includes a discussion of problems with 
implementation of BMPs and information costs. This is followed by a description 
of the first model, LENNART, a net-based interactive DSS. The following section 
describes a composite market model for Transferable Discharge Permits (TDP) 
that specifically includes NPS agricultural runoff. The last model of the three 
models described here, CATCH, is designed to support stakeholder participation in 
catchment management policy. 
 
2.1 Agri-environmental programs  
Eutrophication is a problem that involves non-point source (NPS) pollution as a 
primary contributing factor. Sectorally defined discharge sources which are 
sufficiently concentrated may, however, be identified and abatement measures   22
suggested which decrease discharges from that particular sectoral source. This is 
the case for example, for the contribution of agriculture to surplus levels of 
nitrogen in catchment basins. Nitrogen is transferred from the agricultural sector 
by agricultural end products and by release to either air or water.  
 
Agri-environmental policies built upon the use of economic incentives are 
commonly used to achieve environmental goals. In general, economic incentives 
are intended to induce voluntary compliance with policy objectives through profit 
maximizing/cost minimizing behavior. In particular, many agri-environmental 
programs with the goal of introducing best management practices on the farm are 
promoted through the possibility for increases in income from subsidies or the 
avoidance of decreases in income from penalties (taxes or fees). The decision to 
adopt or not adopt by targeted actors rests on the individual actor’s estimate of the 
expected effect of implementation on returns. This estimate is in turn the 
determining factor for the success of the policy.  
 
Many of the agronomic practices that contribute to nitrogen leaching are 
connected with field cultivation practices. Changes in agronomic practices, best 
management practices (BMPs), have been identified which could substantially 
reduce the level of nitrogen leaching (Leathers, 1991; Trachtenberg and Ogg, 
1994; Gustafson et al. 1998). Implementation of BMPs by farmers is generally 
assumed to be voluntary, encouraged by support from extension services or other 
government programs (Reichelderfer, 1990; Leathers, 1991; Feather & Amacher, 
1994; Norton et al, 1994;). However, these programs have not achieved expected 
results (Setia & Magleby, 1987; Wolf, 1995; Gustafson et al, 1998; Shortle et al, 
2001; Collentine, 2002a). 
  
An evaluation of the Wisconsin Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Abatement 
program concluded "it is reasonably clear that the low level of participation in the 
voluntary NPS program make up the weak link in the administrative chain 
between program implementation and better water quality" (Wolf, 1995, p.1021). 
A Swedish regional study (Gustafson et al, 1998, p.187) concludes that with regard 
to the lack of participation in voluntary measures “there seems to be an urgent 
need for an intensive programme for information, education and advisory services 
to farmers if the goals on water quality set by the government for the Laholm Bay 
area [coastal area in southern Sweden] should be achieved within a reasonable 
time period. But also implementation of new more effective tools seems to be 
necessary.”  
 
Cultivation practices that can reduce nitrogen leaching have been supported in 
Sweden through a program of subsidies directed at specific regions. Several 
measures have been promoted in this way; creation of wetland areas, extensive 
pasture and buffer zones along watercourses, the use of catch crops, and long term 
pasture. The original goal of the catch crop program when it was initiated in 1995 
was that 39,000 hectares would eventually be signed up with the program. The 
level of compensation was set at 500 SEK/ha. During 1996, a little over 4,800 
acres, representing around 12% of the goal, were included in the program. Due to 
this low interest the compensation level was almost doubled in 1998 to 900 
SEK/ha after a recommendation by the Swedish Board of Agriculture. This 
increase led to a somewhat higher participation rate, an enrolment of 7,900 hectares or about 20% of the target level but the low level of participation led to a 
new set of recommendations from the Board of Agriculture. Participation rules 
were relaxed with respect to dates for sowing and plowing in the catch crop and 
complementary payments could be received for delayed cultivation (SOU, 1999). 
While the new rules have led to oversubscription in the program the question of 
which factors led first to the lower than expected participation rate and then to the 
greater than expected participation rate have yet to be understood.
10  
 
The success of agri-environmental policy, and thus the cost effectiveness of 
these policies, will be enhanced through an understanding of the factors that 
determine how producers make choices with regard to BMP implementation (i.e. 
when to adopt and which measures to adopt).
11 If these factors are better 
understood, then information flows may be developed which support the decision 
of farmers to adopt specific measures as well as support authorities in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of agri-environmental policy. Henry Buller 
observed (1999, p.105-6) in a report on the implementation and effectiveness of 
agri-environmental schemes, that because “Agri-environmental policy occupies an 
ill-defined middle ground between regulatory approaches to environmental 
management …and more classic generalized market instruments  … [that] agri-
environmental policy critically needs to be placed at the level of the farmer and the 
farm”. That is, successful programs begin with an understanding how farmers on 
their farms make management choices. 
 
Figure 3. Adoption of BMPs by agricultural producers. 
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Evaluation of BMPs 
One of the problems with discussion of economic analysis of agronomic measures 
is that there is sometimes confusion over how we are working with these 
measures, particularly when we are using terms such as “cost effectiveness” and 
  23
                                                 
10 For a more complete description of the former program and an analysis of the 
low participation rate see Collentine 2002a. 
11 See Drake, Bergström & Svedsätter (1999) or Buller (1999) for studies of how 
farmers’ attitudes may affect uptake in voluntary agri-environmental programs. “economic efficiency”.
12 The menu of BMPs in Figure 3 lists examples of 
measures that are generally regarded to be of interest to reduce nitrogen leaching 
from cultivated land. They may or may not be cost effective or economically 
efficient. The uncertainty lies in where the practices are adopted, both with respect 
to the effect of the measure(s) on leaching and with respect to the economic effect 
of the measure. To move from the list of BMPs to actual adoption requires some 
type of policy, such as the spread of relevant information, the establishment of 
institutional forms, use of economic incentives, etc. These techniques that may 
lead to adoption of measures also have associated costs, which vary depending on 
factors such as the rate of adoption, monitoring, administration, etc. Cost 
effectiveness and cost efficiency are neither independent of the policies for 
implementation of measures nor independent of the adoption decisions on 
individual farms/fields. 
 
Figure 4. BMPs, from development to adoption. 
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A second problem with the analysis of agronomic measures (BMPs) is 
illustrated in Figure 4. The path from development of adoption of BMPs moves 
through three phases: testing, implementation and adoption. The movement 
through the three phases is not necessarily linear but a feedback loop, where each 
of the four boxes in Figure 4 may provide feedback to a previous phase (box). The 
purpose of the testing phase is to look for individual BMPs that may then be 
included in the menu list in Figure 3. These individual BMPs must be technically 
and economically feasible, therefore it is necessary to perform some sort of 
economic analysis in this phase, but this analysis can’t determine which of the 
measures is most cost effective, only that it is a reasonable measure to continue 
analyzing. In the following phase, measures that are deemed to be of interest in the 
testing phase are the subjects of analysis for the purpose of determining what form 
of policy may be most effective (reasonable) from the authorities’ point of view. In 
the second part of the implementation phase farmers need to evaluate the policy 
suggestions that in turn lead into the last phase adoption. It is first when the last 
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12 See Leathers (1991) for an in depth comparison of best management practices 
and socially optimal practices.   25
stage is complete that we can make determinations about cost efficiency as by then 
the total costs are included and the spatial distribution is known. 
 
The feedback loop describes the possibility that information in that phase may 
lead to lead to adaptation at an earlier phase of the measure itself, in the policy for 
implementation or in the decision by the farmer. For example, if a measure is not 
adopted then perhaps there needs to be a change in the policy for adoption (this 
was the case for catch crops). What this means for economic analysis of BMPs, is 
that the type of analysis that should be performed depends on which phase the 
measure under consideration is in. 
 
Cost effectiveness, measured as the cost of nutrient reduction measured in 
kilograms per acre, depends then on where the measure is adopted and the cost of 
adoption, including the cost to the farmer and the cost for the policy. Thus, even 
though a particular measure may be quite costly, if there is a large effect on 
leaching because of where it is adopted, it may be more cost effective than a 
measure that carries a low cost but which because of the spatial distribution, has a 
low effect. 
 
Information costs, spatial scale and decision heuristics 
Information costs are directly related to the effort needed to access and process 
information. For example, ascertaining the weather today at the place one is 
standing is possible at a relatively low access cost (looking outside, opening the 
window, or perhaps going outside). In this case there is little effort that needs to be 
made to gather information. The cost of processing this information is also low if 
we use a simple decision rule, a decision heuristic, that weather tomorrow is most 
often like the weather today. On the other hand, if we were instead interested in 
knowing how the weather is today with respect to what is normal for this time of 
year or the exact level of humidity in the air, the access and processing costs 
would rise considerably. The access cost depends in part on what demands we 
place on the type of information we are interested in. The processing cost relates to 
how readily the information accessed may be used in supporting a decision. These 
two components of information costs, access and processing, are difficult to 
separate in practice because the decision of what type of information to look for 
(accessed) is dependent on how the information will be used (processed). 
Therefore in the following, explicit reference is made to access costs but this 
implicitly assumes predetermined processing costs. 
 
Spatial information can be either site specific or general. From the weather 
example, we might differentiate between weather on a broad spatial scale (the 
weather today in Sweden) and a narrow, site specific, spatial scale (weather on the 
island of Lidingö, a suburb of Stockholm). The access cost of information on a 
broad spatial scale may be high or low, again it depends on the demands we place 
on the information. If the scale of weather we are interested in is broad, we can 
look out the window or purchase a newspaper, and check the weather; both of 
these associated with a low access cost, and then call this weather in Sweden. If on 
the other hand, we are interested in a narrower scale, predicting the weather on our 
particular farm, we might want to first study the correlation between local weather 
and weather in Sweden in general, a high access cost, and then adjust our observation of local weather by using this correlation to predict the weather 
expected on the farm.  
 
The relationship between spatial scale and access cost is represented in Figure 5. 
In the figure, quadrant I represents cases where there is a high access cost for 
information on a narrow spatial scale. This access cost falls with movement along 
the x axis towards quadrant II. Moving upward along the y axis would indicate an 
increasingly narrow spatial scale. For example, access to information with regard 
to fertilization schedules for a farmer could be on a broad spatial scale if the 
information were applicable on a regional basis based on regional climatic factors.  
 
Figure 5.  Access cost to spatial information. 
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If the information were available through a phone call to a farm adviser then this 
could be obtained at a low access cost as well (quadrant III). However, a farmer 
growing a particular crop on a particular field might be interested in applying a 
site-specific fertilizing schedule. This may be obtained by first performing soil 
tests on the field and then studying and comparing research results for the 
particular crop and soil type using alternative fertilization schedules, all of these 
activities indicate an upward movement on the spatial scale. In addition, this 
method would also, in all likelihood, be associated with high access costs 
(quadrant I). 
 
There is a trade-off that is possible to make between the scale, which may also 
be regarded as a proxy for reliability, and access cost. However, in certain 
circumstances it may be possible to gain access to locally specific information at a 
low cost. With respect to the fertilization example described above, another 
method for accessing information would be to assign a high degree of reliability to 
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another farmer in the same area with what might be known to be a similar type of 
soil and then follow the application schedule observed on this field or the schedule 
recommended by that particular farmer, a method which could result in a low 
access cost and a high degree of spite specificity (quadrant II). This method is a 
decision heuristic, a cognitive method for reducing the decision fields of complex 
problems to make them tractable, a technique associated with bounded rationality. 
 
2.2 Decision support for field management  
Decision support systems (DSS) are computer-based models designed to serve 
decision makers by processing flows of information. The starting point in the 
development of a DSS is the identification of the problem faced by the intended 
users of the system.  The problem initially defined for analysis for the model 
LENNART was the lack of enrolment in a voluntary agro-environmental program 
targeted at the reduction of nitrogen leaching from cultivated land. In particular the 
Swedish program which offered subsidies for the cultivation of catch crops 
(Collentine, 2002a). Based on their analysis of the problem the development team 
(an economist, a soil scientist and a systems analyst) identified two elements 
which should be incorporated in a DSS; the possibility for the user to calculate the 
effect on farm income of program supported agronomic practices (BMPs) and 
providing the user with information on the estimated reduction in nutrient losses 
from adopting the practices. The first of these was perceived to be the determining 
factor behind the program adoption decision by farmers that resulted in the lack of 
enrolment in the program while the second was regarded as the social motivation 
for paying the subsidy to support the programs.  
 
LENNART is a net-based decision support system (DSS) that has been designed 
to evaluate agronomic practices to reduce nitrogen leaching. The model is 
designed to be used by individual farmers or farm advisers to explore results of 
modifications of farming practices, both the effect on the income of the farmer(s) 
and the effect on the leaching of nitrogen. Some examples of these BMPs are catch 
crops, cultivation timing and fertilizer application timing. The base unit of this 
model is the field level (hectare). Farms, sub-catchments, catchments or other 
regions of interest can be built up from a field level. The principle idea is that each 
user can adjust the model to reflect local conditions based on user information. 
This allows for flexibility in use of the model and ensures that the user is in control 
of the results generated by the model through control over model inputs. 
 
Costs evaluated at the field level for each agronomic activity or effect associated 
with the cultivation of catch crops are the determining factors for the decision by 
individual farmers to enroll acreage in the catch crop program. Modeling this farm 
level decision may be done by first disaggregating the activities and then 
estimating each of the choice variables. This is the linear cost model described in 
Article 1. For catch crops, Collentine (2002a) identifies four agronomic activities 
and effects with a total of 14 choice variables at the farm and field levels. If the 
costs represented by the choice variables were known, then performing the 
calculation is a relatively simple procedure that could be done on a handheld 
calculator without a great deal of effort. However, since the choice to implement 
the use of catch crops on the farm is based on the assumption that the technique is   28
                                                
not already being used, it is reasonable to assume that there is uncertainty with 
respect to the expected values. A farmer evaluating the decision may be expected 
to perform some type of ‘what if’ (sensitivity) analysis. What if the expected cost 
variables were lower/higher than average, how might this affect the cost of the 
agronomic activity and in turn, the decision to adopt the measure?  
 
If a farmer were to choose only three values for each of these uncertain values 
(low, average, high) to use in calculating expected costs, the total number of cost 
combinations to evaluate in one time period, are equal to 3
14, for a total of 
4,782,969 possible cost combinations! Furthermore, before solving the total costs 
for each combination of costs during one time period is even possible, high and 
low estimates for each of the variables must be made.
13 In addition, the costs of 
accessing the information needed to make these estimates also need to be included 
in the choice model.  
 
Bounded rationality and the use of heuristics 
In the 1950s Herbert Simon (1956) introduced the concept of bounded rationality 
to describe the process by which decision makers are limited by cognitive 
constraints in the search for, and evaluation of, the information used in making 
decisions. In the neo-classical model of economic optimization, a rationally 
economic actor would be expected to evaluate all the consequences of the decision 
under consideration and to choose the alternative that maximized returns (utility). 
However, what Simon introduced was the idea that each actor is limited by both 
knowledge and computational capacity and must of necessity limit the alternatives 
and consequences considered to make the decision tractable. This then results in a 
bounded rational choice rather than an optimal choice being made, a choice that is 
described as ‘satisficing’ rather than ‘optimizing’ from the decision maker’s 
perspective (Simon, 1987; Hogarth, 1987). Optimization theory disregards 
decision processes and cognitive limitations (van den Bergh et al, 2000; Laville, 
2000). Application of the theory of bounded rationality explicitly concentrates on 
the role of the decision maker with respect to the problem at hand, the processes 
that are used for decision making as well as the limitations imposed by the 
computational capacity of individuals.
 14 
    
In the choice model described above, it was noted that a rational farmer could 
perform as many as 4,782,969 calculations in order to estimate the economic 
consequences of cultivating a catch crop on a particular field before determining 
the optimal choice. Even if an impulse to perform this heroic task were exhibited, 
the computational demands placed on the decision maker would be next to 
impossible to satisfy without some type of decision support model. In addition, 
even if it were feasible to somehow perform all of these operations, the associated 
 
13 Assuming a triangular distribution for each variable makes the calculation of the 
average a simple combination of these two estimates. 
14 See van den Bergh et al (2000) for a discussion of the implications for 
environmental policy of models which assume that satisficing models based on 
bounded rationality rather than optimization models better explain observed 
individual behavior. opportunity cost would in all likelihood dominate all possible gains. Leading the 
rational farmer to conclude that the measure should either not be adopted or that 
some other lower cost method, with a lower expected information cost for making 
the decision, should be found. Heuristics are used as a method by rational actors 
for reducing information costs in decision-making. 
 
The model builds on the principles of decision making under uncertainty. 
Specifically, it is designed to take into account user decision heuristics such as 
anchoring, availability and representativeness (for an overview of these concepts 
see Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). Persons faced with complex decisions where 
there is uncertainty involved with respect to the outcome of the decision intuitively 
use these decision heuristics. These heuristics serve as a method of structuring 
subjective probabilities associated with possible outcomes. Anchoring is often 
used as a technique for numerical prediction when there is a value available. The 
default values provided by LENNART are designed to serve as available values 
where anchoring is a factor. Availability refers to access to information for making 
estimates of the frequency of events. LENNART provides access to other users 
frequency estimates as well as expert estimates through the use of links to other 
sources of information. For example, Figure 6 illustrates how user inputted costs 
for sowing catch crops compare to the estimates made by the Swedish Board of 
Agriculture. Representativeness is used in making judgments about the stationarity 
of observations, that is, whether the events associated by the user for decision 
support belong to the same class of events. To support the use of this heuristic,  
 
Figure 6. Comparative summary page in LENNART for farm users (in Swedish). 
 
 
 
LENNART provides access to other classes of users in the database and supports 
the user in determining whether the chosen classes are representative for the 
decision being considered. By taking into account these LENNART provides a 
unique opportunity through the use of modern information techniques to explore 
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how these types of decision heuristics can be actively incorporated into a decision 
support tool. 
 
Net-based platform for a DSS 
LENNART has been programmed to be used from a server based web site 
accessed through the Internet. There are three primary factors that led to this 
choice of platforms; access factors, development factors and database factors. A 
server-based program promotes access for a wide group of intended users. 
Multiple users from individual computers can access the site. The only personal 
computer software requirement being a standard web navigating program 
(Netscape or Explorer).  Enabling access to the program through individual 
computer connections also allows the program to be demonstrated in a variety of 
environments; farm advisers can demonstrate use of the program in consultations 
with farmers during farm visits, the program can be demonstrated and used by 
groups in seminars, in addition to being used pedagogically, the web site address 
can also be linked to other sites or promoted through campaigns in other media as 
well as passed on from user to user.  
 
Development of the model can be continuous over time as control over the 
version being used is determined through the server. This quality also means that 
no problems arise with versions being used that are out of date. Each time a user 
logs on the version that becomes available is determined through commands on the 
server. This also allows for partitioning over time to test development of model 
components. Experimental versions can be tested and results compared so that user 
reference groups are designated by the version that they are using rather than 
determined in advance. For example, inclusion of a wizard format or tutorial can 
be tested by incorporating that component into the model made available to users 
on the server over for a specific period of time or a specified number of runs. 
Results from this partitioned model can be compared and choices made by model 
developers with respect to incorporation or development of the most favorable 
components. The net-based format also allows for incorporation of changes in 
development of the natural science process based sub-model SOILN DB (Johnsson 
et al, 2002). The server platform of LENNART allows changes to be made in the 
user available model as soon as new information becomes available. The entire 
model doesn't need to be replaced, just those changes which are made to the 
model. This makes it possible at low cost, for the model LENNART to incorporate 
the best information available. 
 
The location of the model on a server also means that the database which is 
developed as the model is used is also located in one place and can be accessed 
from anywhere by designated users. As new data becomes available, i.e. every 
time the model is used, this data is directly available on the server. As described in 
more detail below in the section on decision scenarios, this database function is 
important in different ways for different categories of users. The immediacy of 
availability supports both users that are interested in comparative data and users 
that are interested in aggregate data for policy evaluation and design. The 
partitioning described above is also possible with respect to the database. Open   31
                                                
access to the entire database through the Internet makes it possible for those users 
that are interested in the model to actively work with the database for this purpose. 
 
The model currently allows users to evaluate the economic effect and the 
expected reduction in nitrogen leaching from cultivation of catch crops for a set of 
crop rotations in a specific area of Southern Sweden. Expansion is planned to both 
cover a larger geographic area and to include a greater number of soil types and 
crop rotations. In addition, the development team plans to improve the graphic 
interface through the use of focus group tests. Preliminary work is also underway 
to allow the evaluation of other field management measures in LENNART. New 
measures planned for development in extensions of the model include the 
reduction of fertilization intensity on fields and measures where timeliness is a 
factor such as the timing of cultivation in combination with other practices and the 
timing of fertilizer applications. Since measures where timeliness is a factor may 
have an effect on other farm activities beyond the individual field, a preliminary 
study of these types of measures is necessary before they may be included in 
LENNART. 
 
2.3 A market for tradable discharge permits   
Environmental policies that establish a tradable discharge permits (TDPs) system 
are economic instruments that offer a great deal of flexibility to polluters and thus 
are often construed to be cost effective.
15 This has led to a great deal of enthusiasm 
for TDP policies and led to rapid development and design of programs of this type 
(Woodward et al, 2002; EPA, 2003). Unfortunately, as Stavins (1995, p.9) 
observed “In some cases, environmental policymaking has outrun our basic 
understanding of the new pollution control instruments” and “Consequently, the 
claims made for the cost effectiveness of marketable permit systems often have 
exceeded what can be reasonably anticipated.”  
 
Achievement of mandated water quality standards has increasingly focused on 
the role of NPS discharges, in particular, runoff of nutrients from agricultural 
activities (EPA, 2000; Horan et al, 2002). The use of TDP markets as a policy 
solution has been advocated both by economists and policymakers as the most 
promising policy alternative, the most cost effective means, of meeting 
environmental targets. The United States Environmental Protection Agency in a 
recent report (EPA, 2003) “believes that market-based approaches such as water 
quality trading provide greater flexibility and have potential to achieve water 
quality and benefits greater than would otherwise be achieved under more 
traditional regulatory approaches” and that  “market-based programs can achieve 
water quality goals at a substantial economic savings”. Although the validity of 
this statement may be questioned, what is certain is that the lower the total cost of 
 
15 See Collentine (2002b) for an analysis of why under a standard set of 
assumptions tradable permit systems will always appear to be the most cost 
effective policy alternative.   32
                                                
a particular policy such as trading, the greater is the possibility for achieving 
savings.
16 
 
In a TDP market, the price signal provides information to market agents, 
dischargers of pollution, which may be used for valuation of their decision 
alternatives, in particular, their decisions with respect to implementation of 
abatement measures. The price signal provides information about the minimum 
value assigned to the discharge permit by purchasers and in addition, is also an 
indication of their marginal abatement costs. The underlying assumptions that 
abatement costs per unit of emission vary among discharge sources, that 
information about abatement alternatives is available to the source but not to other 
actors and that price signals convey this information, lead to the conclusion that a 
TDP market offers a cost effective policy alternative for achieving discharge 
targets. A trading program through “introducing transferability … offers the 
potential for substantially lowering costs and for encouraging technological 
[abatement] progress” (Tietenberg, 2000, p.176). 
 
Tradable discharge permit programs may be economically efficient if transaction 
costs are internalized and individual abatement cost functions are known to permit 
holders (owners). This latter condition is the information needed to motivate 
trading. Least cost solutions are possible even when this information is not 
publicly known. However, discharge loads need to be quantifiable before permits 
can be allocated, that is, before property rights to these loads can be assigned to 
individual dischargers. The permits must have a common unit of measure to define 
value for the buyer and seller. A paper by (Malik et al., 1994, p.477) identifies the 
problem of measurement in trading programs explicitly, “Since nonpoint loadings 
cannot be measured, they cannot be traded directly.” Permits and hence tradable 
permit systems have no value unless they refer to a specific quantifiable loading. 
This quantity provides the measure that makes allocation of property rights 
possible based on ambient water quality defined as a limit on loading. 
 
Composite market model for TDP 
The advantages of a composite market model are the flexibility that the model 
offers a catchment based agency for implementation of a TDP system. The model 
makes possible the development of TDP markets adapted to the particular needs 
and limitations of individual catchments. Implementation may take place over time 
without major new investments and adapt to new information and technological 
innovations as these become available. Cost efficiencies arise in the composite 
market model in part through dividing a TDP market transactions into functional 
components and thereby providing flexibility to the catchment agency in the 
development of market incentives, i.e. price signals. The composite market 
disaggregates permit transactions into two primary markets and one secondary 
 
16 The cost effectiveness of taxes, a traditional regulatory approach, is not 
explicitly evaluated anywhere in this thesis. Although in many circumstances a tax 
may offer a possibility for low transaction costs, the primary intention of the 
research in this thesis is to explore design options for an effective tradable permit 
market i.e. not the evaluation of solution alternatives. market (Figure 7). All three of these markets provide price signals for dischargers 
to use in making abatement investment decisions. Compared to conventional 
trading programs, the composite market design enhances the opportunity for TDP 
programs to achieve their goals by offering a market structure which reduces the 
transaction costs of information, assigns limited property rights and can be 
implemented in stages. These factors all contribute to realizing the potential 
offered by viable markets in discharge permits. 
 
Figure 7. Information flows in a composite market model for agricultural 
discharges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Primary Sellers Market 
BMPs 
-cost sharing (i) 
- cost of 
management     
subsidies (i) 
- cost of 
management 
contracts (i) 
Runoff model 
modeled 
discharge 
quantity 
reduction (i) 
S=ΣMCAi
(b) Primary Buyers Market
P/cost
Q discharge 
reduction  D1=ΣMCA1
Q discharge 
units 
Q discharge 
permits (units)
P/cost 
P/cost 
P1
PN
Price/cost reduction  
(kg
-1  year
-1) 
P*N 
P*1 
P*N 
P*1 
(c) Secondary Market 
DN
D2
QP 
PP 
DN=ΣMCAN
S=ΣQ
QN Q1
Q1
 
  33  34
                                                
Property rights  
The composite market structure assigns and transforms property rights in the two 
primary markets. In the primary sellers market the regulatory agency, the buyer, 
assumes liability for controlling the terms of the transaction, that is, monitors and 
enforces the contractual agreement. For example, in the case of a uniform subsidy 
for a BMP such as spring tillage, the regulatory institution ensures that the 
recipient of the payment performs in accord with the agreement and is able to take 
actions if a violation of the terms is discovered. Therefore in this market the buyer, 
the agency, assigns limited property rights to the transaction by assuming the 
liability for control of the agreement. In the primary buyers market the regulatory 
agency, the seller, offers a permit, a license, for a specific quantity of discharge 
over a specified period of time. The limited property rights represented by the 
discharge permit are also transferable to another party subject to approval of the 
transfer by the issuer of the permit, the regulatory agency. The buyer’s liability in 
this market is to conform to the limits specified in the permit and to have agency 
approval before transferring the permit. These liabilities follow the permit in all 
transactions in the secondary market. There are no new property rights assigned in 
this market beyond those designated by the original permit issue. The control of 
the use of the permit, monitoring and enforcement, remains with the regulatory 
agency. Thus the sellers market transfers liability for control of discharge 
reduction activities to the buyer and the buyers market assigns a limited set of 
property rights to the permit purchaser that are not related to the control of 
reduction credits 
 
Transaction costs 
The composite market system is designed to minimize transaction costs in several 
ways. The information and search costs for market actors for a trading partner are 
minimized through the primary markets. In both of these markets a regulatory 
agency serves as one part in the transaction, the other part is a discharging source. 
There are two types of discharge sources; the discharge source that is constrained 
by regulation into making a choice with respect to investment in abatement 
measures and the discharge source that is not constrained but which has the option 
of making the choice if it is economically advantageous. The choice constrained 
discharger represents demand for permits in the primary buyers market. This type 
of discharge source is faced with a choice between investing in abatement and 
purchasing corresponding discharge permits. The buyers market provides a price 
signal for use in making this decision. The permit price represents the relevant 
marginal cost of abatement for other discharge sources. The information costs for 
each source are limited to those for evaluating their own abatement cost for a 
particular level of reduction. If there is a repurchase clause in the permit then this 
information can be evaluated as it becomes available without incurring additional 
costs for the timeliness of the decision.
17 
 
 
17 An example of this is the observation by Netusil and Braden (1993) that 
“waiting to contract [for abatement] may greatly reduce/enhance a landowners 
gains from contracting”.   35
                                                
The non-constrained discharger will choose to offer reduction credits for sale in 
the primary sellers market if the particular measure represents a gain in income. 
The price paid by the regulatory agency is transformed through a model into a 
marginal abatement cost for a specific reduction quantity. The information costs 
for discharge sources in this market are restricted to the costs for the contemplated 
abatement measure (see Collentine, 2002a). The price in this market is an 
indication of the marginal abatement cost that the agency currently pays for 
reduction costs and serves as a price signal for sources in their investment 
decision.  
 
Another way that the composite market minimizes transaction costs is where 
there are decreasing marginal transaction costs in the market. Several studies 
(Stavins, 1995; Tietenberg, 2000) have suggested that transaction costs fall as the 
number of transactions increases. This effect is due to several factors; the presence 
of fixed transaction costs, the increased ability to process information made 
available through repetition and the decrease in negotiation costs possible through 
repeated transactions. As noted above, information costs for sources are restricted 
to either the costs of implementing a specific measure or the costs of estimating 
abatement costs. Once these costs are incurred they represent a sunk cost for 
decision purposes and ex post are no longer relevant as transaction costs for 
additional decisions (Buchanan, 1969). For sources repeating the evaluation of a 
particular abatement measure in a new environment (a new field for example) 
many of these adoption costs are the same and the incremental changes easier to 
calculate (Collentine, 2002a). Finally, since all transactions in the two primary 
markets represent negotiation with the same agency, standardization of the 
contracts is possible which leads to falling transaction costs as the number of 
agreements increases. 
 
2.4 Stakeholder participation in catchment management  
Management of water resources in catchment areas is a question of allocating 
resources based on priorities in the particular catchment. Water allocation supports 
a complex set of socioeconomic and ecological systems, which may be negatively 
affected under alternative management strategies. A concurrent emphasis on 
involving stakeholders in resource management has created a need for the 
development of decision support techniques to assist stakeholders in this process. 
The CATCH model attempts to provide a structural method for involving 
stakeholders in the allocation of water resources in catchment areas. 
 
The CATCH model operationalizes principles of deliberative democracy into a 
framework that promotes discourse and deliberation while maintaining a focus on 
organizational tasks.
 18 The building blocks of the model are descriptions of 
 
18 See Dryzek (2000), Pellezzoni (1999) or Jacobs (1997) for descriptions of 
theory and principles which support the idea of deliberative democracy.   36
stakeholder relevant socio-economic parameters for the particular catchment.
19 
There is no quantitative measurement of the parameters; instead the relationships 
between parameters are qualitatively described as a part of the process. Tradeoffs 
are a part of the deliberative discourse and may occur at various stages in planning 
and implementation. The language for evaluation of the tradeoffs is the set of 
common definitions developed for the model. 
 
Identification of the parameters is a deliberative discursive task. These 
parameters should describe the relevant goals for evaluating management 
alternatives in the catchment area.
20 These are the values, which drive the 
allocation between competing interests, i.e. the provision of water services. Since 
the parameters evolve through discourse between individual stakeholders, they 
represent not only individual tastes and preferences but also, the preferences of the 
interest groups, which these individuals implicitly represent. In this sense the 
expressed values, described here as socio-economic parameters, represent a 
domain of both private and public interests. The list of parameters in Figure 8 
evolved from a dialogue in an experimental setting (Collentine et al., 2000). 
 
Figure 8. CATCH: Example of socio-economic parameters 
 
• Local support: level of support for proposals and decisions amongst local 
present and future stakeholders. The greater the local support the less risk 
for conflicts between stakeholders. 
• Bio-diversity: landscape and biotope variation, both with respect to the presence 
of species as well as environment. 
• Recreation: free activities which presume access to natural resources,  
  such as hiking, bird watching, swimming etc. 
• Diversified economy: a variety of business activities. Greater variety provides 
greater regional economic stability. 
• Culture: present and historic expressions of human culture. 
• Hydrological balance: water levels are maintained at a natural level. Balance 
between rate of withdraws and recharging to avoid undesired changes in 
water tables. 
• Regional economy: diversified and effective exploitation of resources in 
addition to economic growth. 
 
Once a set of socio-economic parameters has been agreed upon, the next step is 
to evaluate the relationships between the parameters. What effect does a change in 
one parameter have on the remaining parameters? This is analyzed by constructing 
a series of matrices with each parameter listed on each axis. The relationships are 
decomposed into two spatial components, regional and local effects, in addition to 
positive and negative changes in individual parameters to describe the range of the 
                                                 
19 Since these parameters may include bio-physical indicators such as ‘bio-
diversity’ and ‘hydrological balance’ (see Figure 8) references in the text to socio-
economic parameters should be broadly interpreted to include indicators as well. 
20 These parameters correspond to the ‘fundamental objectives’ used in multi-
attribute utility techniques.  See for example Gregory (2000).   37
relationships. For example, Table 2 describes the cross effects of positive changes 
in the socio-economic parameters on a regional level. There are four possible types 
of effects in the relationship between two variables. In Table 2 a positive effect (+) 
indicates that a positive change in the row variable leads to an increase in the 
column variable. Both the type of change and the resultant increase are defined by 
the consensual definitions of the socio-economic parameters (Figure 8). 
 
This discussion, deliberation and evaluation of effects as represented by the 
matrices described here, is the core of the model. It is during these deliberations 
that a common language evolves which may be used to analyze allocation 
problems and argue for particular allocations. It is also possible to incorporate 
external expertise and informational sources into the deliberation process. For 
example, it may be necessary to describe the present state of biodiversity at the site 
or in the catchment, in order to analyze whether a change may lead to an expected 
increase or a decrease in biodiversity. It is easier to translate this need for more 
information into a search for unbiased information, as at this point in the process, 
strategic positioning, based on stakeholder interests in allocations, has not yet 
entered the decision arena. 
 
The model is unique in several ways. It has specifically been designed to support 
stakeholder involvement in water management at a catchment level. It provides a 
systematic method for developing management objectives, as well as a method for 
 
Table 2. CATCH: Cross effects of positive changes in socio-economic variables 
 on a regional level. (+ = positive effect;  - = negative effect;  0 = insignificant 
effect; +/- = indeterminate effect) 
 
REGIONAL 
Cult. Bio-
diver. 
Div. 
econ. 
Hydro. 
balance 
Local 
support 
Reg.  
econ. 
Rec 
Culture    0 0 0  + +  + 
Bio-diver. 0    0 0  + 0  + 
Div. econ.  0  +    +/- + +  + 
Hydro. bal.  0  +  +    0 +  0 
Local  supp. + + + +    + + 
Reg. econ.  0  -  +/-  0  +    0 
Recreation 0  +/-  0  0 +  +   
 
evaluating individual proposals. In addition, the universally applicable model may 
serve in catchments where stakeholders are directly involved in the decision 
making process, involved in an advisory capacity, or perform a more limited role 
in planning of the type often referred to as focus groups.  
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3. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this thesis is the development of policies and tools for the 
management of water resources at the catchment level, with an emphasis on water 
quality issues. The results of this research effort are the three management support 
models described in the thesis; a DSS for field management, a policy design for a 
tradable permit program and a DSS for stakeholder participation in catchment 
management. There are several common factors in all three of the models. Firstly, 
the models have all been developed within the prevailing decision environment. 
Secondly, the analytical method used has been to start with identification of the 
problem and the relevant decision makers. Thirdly, each of the models focuses on 
the flows of information to decision makers. Fourthly, the models all include a 
natural science perspective either explicitly incorporated in the model or implicitly 
included as part of the model design. Finally, each of the models is compatible 
with other models and techniques for water management. 
 
The starting point in the body of research presented in the three models has been 
the institutional conditions prevailing in OECD countries.
21 The push for 
management of water resources both in the EU through the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) and in the US has opened up a need for management tools that 
have been developed for use at this level. A catchment focus presumes that there 
are advantages to management at this level. The primary reason for advocating 
management is that water allocation/reallocation decisions have the greatest 
impact on local interests, stakeholders. Allocation decisions between conflicting 
interests are both quantity and quality decisions. Water quality management is 
spatially local, that is, there must be spatial contact surfaces for polluting activities 
to have an impact on water quality. Development of catchment management tools 
therefore should include local stakeholder interests and spatially local quality 
problems as well as work within the institutional framework at the catchment 
level.  
 
Two of the models were developed to work toward resolution of a specific 
environmental problem, eutrophication. Eutrophication is caused by an 
overabundance of nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus) in bodies of water. The 
contribution of agricultural practices to the problem through runoff and leaching is 
significant. Agri-environmental policies have concentrated on the voluntary and 
regulated adoption of Best Management Practices (BMPs) to reduce the flows of 
nutrients coming from farming. Farmers and their field management decisions are 
the focus of the DSS LENNART. Tradable permit programs offer greater 
possibilities for cost efficiencies if marginal abatement costs vary widely across 
discharge sources. If non-point sources (NPS) such as agricultural producers can 
be included within a nutrient emissions trading program the potential benefits 
increase. Relevant decision makers in a viable trading permit program include both 
 
21 While this focus on institutional relations within OECD countries was used to 
develop the models, the principles underlying the models are universal and may be 
used to develop similar models within other institutional structures.   39
discharge source decision makers and regulatory authorities. The third model 
addresses the problem of how to identify stakeholders and how to include 
stakeholder values in management decisions. 
 
Information flows are the support for decisions. Access to information has a 
cost, it must be searched for and then processed for the particular decision. These 
costs may be included as transaction costs when evaluating a particular decision 
however after they have been incurred they represent sunk costs for decision 
purposes. These information costs represent the cost of decision making in a 
‘messy’ world of time constraints, partial (asymmetric) information, site-specific 
physical parameters and individual values.  
 
Given the high cost of full or perfect information, Herbert Simon (1956) 
suggested that decision makers make their choices in a world of ‘bounded 
rationality’ where choices are not always optimal but they are satisfactory in that 
particular situation. One of the problems with the theory of bounded rationality 
was that it was difficult to determine a decision rule for analytical purposes that 
corresponded to the simple decision rule associated with optimality. Thus while it 
appeared that Simon’s theory explained observed behavior in a more satisfactory 
way than the rational man argument of neo-classical analysis the lack of decision 
rules was an impediment to development of models. Two psychologists, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, analyzing decisions made in experimental settings 
suggested that decision makers used simple decision aids called heuristics that 
lowered information costs. Three general types of these ‘rules of thumb’ were 
identified by Kahneman and Tversky (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982); 
representativeness, anchoring and availability. Design of the model for field 
management decisions, LENNART, builds on and supports the use of these 
decision heuristics by farmers.  
 
Prices and costs are signals of information to decision makers. A price in a 
competitive environment represents the marginal cost of production. The price of a 
trading permit in a competitive market represents the marginal abatement cost of 
discharge sources and therefore can be used in making abatement investment 
decisions. If however, the price is unreliable as an indicator of marginal abatement 
costs it has a low informational value. The structure of the composite market 
model is designed to increase the reliability of permit prices and the flow of 
information to discharge source decision makers. 
 
Representation of stakeholder interests can take many forms. If it is assumed that 
preferences are stable and independent of each other, then evaluation of 
stakeholder interests can take place for example as a survey where the elicited 
individual values are aggregated and then used for making a decision. The simplest 
form of this is representative democracy. If however, preferences (values) are 
dynamic and develop through interaction and flows of information, then discourse 
and deliberation can be methods that support the development of collective 
preferences. The model CATCH is an operational structure for creating an 
environment of discourse and deliberation among stakeholders.  
 
Each of the three models includes a natural science perspective. The DSS for 
field management includes a database (SOILNDB) for estimating the effect on   40
nitrogen leaching when field information for calculating the economic effect of 
BMPs is entered by the user. The reason for including leaching estimates is 
pedagogical; including the estimates will make these values available to the user. 
For other users such as researchers or authorities the leaching estimates may be 
used for program evaluation purposes. An integral component of the composite 
market model is the use of natural science models such as SOILNDB for 
calculating nutrient losses (runoff). The simulated quantification of losses allows 
these modeled values to be used as fiat values for assigning limited property rights 
to NPS discharges. Without acceptable natural science models the composite 
market model cannot be adopted. The core of the CATCH model is the definition 
by stakeholders of socio-economic parameters and the relationships between these 
parameters. Some of these parameters are likely to be biophysical (hydrological 
balance for example) or have important biophysical characteristics (bio-diversity 
for example) and the relationships defined will often be bio-physically dependent. 
The principles of discourse and deliberation described in the model include access 
to expert information in areas of natural science for definition of the model 
matrices. 
 
The models developed from the research are not comprehensive. They are 
designed to be used separately or in combination with the other models described 
here or with other management models. Each of the models may be an appropriate 
choice in a given set of circumstances or for a particular problem. It may be that 
these models over time will evolve into other subsets of models or that design 
elements are used in developing new models. Including three new models for 
catchment management increases the flexibility of catchment management. 
Providing access to additional tools may allow decision makers to see more than 
just ‘nails’. 
 
Further research 
In the body of work presented in this thesis there are both model development 
issues and theoretical development areas that are of interest for further research. 
Since all three models are theoretical proposals for applied tools or policies to 
work with current problems, the issue of primary interest is the implementation of 
these models. Results from implementation of the models will generate data sets of 
how users express their preferences in their choices. This data in turn may be 
analyzed to gain insight into these processes and the development or testing of 
theories that may explain these processes. The development plans described below 
may be seen as the immediate stages suggested as necessary for implementation of 
the models. 
 
A public domain prototype of the model LENNART is presently available to 
users on a web server. This prototype is limited to the evaluation of catch crops on 
particular soils and crop rotations in a specific climate area of Southern Sweden. 
Development of the model includes expansion of the natural science database to 
include more parameters but more importantly, the program needs to expand the 
number of BMPs, which the model may be used to evaluate.  
 
Implementation of the composite market model is possible to perform in stages. 
The first of these stages is the calculation of marginal abatement costs across NPS   41
dischargers in a particular catchment area. Current support for measures to reduce 
nutrient runoff can be used as the basis for estimating the cost per unit of reduction 
for sources by type. For example, current per hectare subsidies paid out to farmers 
for cultivation of catch crops or spring tillage may be used in combination with a 
nitrogen leaching database (SOILNDB) to differentiate between sources with 
respect to the model calculated marginal abatement costs. Development of a 
program for constraining discharge sources successively is the next stage for 
implementation of the composite market model. As source constraints are adopted 
the calculated marginal abatement costs calculated in the first stage may then be 
used to set permit prices. At this point all three markets within the composite 
model are active and as new information becomes available and the process 
repeats itself the composite market matures. 
 
The next stage toward implementation of the model for stakeholder 
participation, CATCH, is to evaluate the results of using the model with different 
combinations of stakeholder types. An application is planned for a catchment area 
in Southern Sweden that will test the model with four types of stakeholders; two 
homogenous and two heterogeneous groups of 8-10 persons. The working 
hypothesis to be evaluated in the study the importance of the selection of the 
stakeholder group for development of the model matrices. If there is wide variation 
in parameter choices between the four groups then this is an indication that the 
stakeholder selection process must be included and developed as a part of the 
model. Limited differences in the results would support the present model 
assumption that stakeholder selection is of limited importance. 
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